Past Its Prime: Why the Clean Air Act Is In Need of Modification by Smith, Levi
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat 
Volume 46 Issue 1 
2012 
Past Its Prime: Why the Clean Air Act Is In Need of Modification 
Levi Smith 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr_caveat 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Science and Technology 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Levi Smith, Comment, Past Its Prime: Why the Clean Air Act Is In Need of Modification, 46 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM CAVEAT 67 (2012). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr_caveat/vol46/iss1/14 
 
This Comment was originally cited as Volume 2 of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Online. 
Volumes 1, 2, and 3 of MJLR Online have been renumbered 45, 46, and 47 respectively. These updated Volume 
numbers correspond to their companion print Volumes. Additionally, the University of Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform Online was renamed Caveat in 2015. 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
67 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
PAST ITS PRIME: WHY THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS IN NEED OF 
MODIFICATION  
Levi Smith* 
The Clean Air Act (CAA)1 is the primary federal statute 
regulating the emission of air pollutants. First enacted in 1970, 
the CAA requires, inter alia, the federal government to establish 
air quality goals2 and states to develop implementation plans to 
achieve those goals.3 The most stringent requirements of 
the CAA are imposed on “new” or “modified” sources of pollution, 
such as sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and particulate 
matter.4 Sources that were operating when the CAA was enacted 
are mostly exempt from regulation under the Act.5 Because of the 
substantial costs associated with the CAA standards, there is an 
incentive for existing sources to stay in operation instead of 
modifying existing or opening new facilities. This subverts the 
goals of the CAA because the most inefficient and polluting 
sources stay in operation rather than being replaced with newer, 
cleaner plants and new pollution control technologies. This 
Comment argues for federal regulation of existing sources of 
pollution under the CAA and suggests ways by which the federal 
government could encourage investment in newer and cleaner 
industrial sources. 
* J.D. Candidate, December 2013, University of Michigan Law School.
1. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
2. Id. § 7409.
3. Id. § 7410.
4. Id. § 7411 (“Standards of performance for new stationary sources”); see 
also Jonathan Remy Nash &Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental 
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1678 
(2007) (“Congress decided to subject new sources of air pollution to stringent pollution 
control standards.”).  
5. Nash & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1678 (citations omitted) (“[The CAA]
‘grandfathered’ preexisting sources, leaving them free of federal regulation. In the ensuing 
decade … statutory and regulatory development made clear that a ‘modification’ of a 
grandfathered plant that increased the plant’s pollution emissions would subject it to the 
same federal standards applied to ‘new sources.’”).  
J 
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The CAA imposes both technology-based standards on 
individual sources of air pollution6 and national, uniform ambient 
air quality standards.7 States must administer a regulatory 
program that achieves the required ambient air quality standards 
through the use of pollution control technology.8 Pollution 
control can be quite expensive for sources of air pollution.  For 
example, in 2000, the direct compliance costs of the CAA were 
estimated to be around $20 billion for all regulated sources 
combined.9 However, these standards only apply to “new” or 
“modified” sources of pollution.10 New sources are those built after 
the CAA was enacted.11 Modified sources are those that were in 
existence at the time the CAA was enacted but that have 
undergone a “physical change or change in method of operation” 
resulting in an increase in “the amount of any air pollutant 
previously emitted by [the] source or results in the emission of any 
air pollutant not previously emitted.”12 Unmodified existing 
sources are exempt from regulation under the CAA. 
The regulatory gap between new or modified sources and 
existing sources has led to the “Old Plant Effect,” where 
“[d]ifferent regulatory standards for old and new plants distort the 
economic analysis that existing plant owners undertake when 
deciding whether to modernize or replace a plant.”13 The strict 
standards imposed by the CAA make it expensive to modify or 
replace a plant.14 It is less expensive to keep an older, unmodified 
plant in operation because air quality standards for these plants 
are not nearly as strict.15 Thus, so long as existing plants remain in 
operation, the goals of the CAA remain out of reach. 
The Old Plant Effect and the lack of regulation of existing 
sources can be explained by erroneous congressional assumptions 
during the CAA’s passage. Legislators assumed that most existing 
6. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
7. Id. § 7409.
8. Id. § 7410.
9. See U.S. ENVTL. & PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020, 3–7 (2011), available at http://www.epa.go 
v/oar/sect812/feb11/fullreport.pdf.  
10. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
11. Id. § 7411(a)(2).
12. Id. § 7411(a)(4).
13. Nash & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1708
14. Id. 
15. Id.  
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sources had a useful economic life of thirty to forty years, 
meaning most existing sources would be transitioned to newer 
sources subject to federal regulation in short order.16 This proved 
not to be the case. The economic realities of complying with 
the CAA incentivized plant owners to keep existing plants in 
operation far beyond the date they were projected to remain 
useful, thus avoiding the CAA regulatory regime.17 
To achieve the goals of the CAA, existing sources need to be 
brought into the regulatory fold. Congress should amend 
the CAA to impose technology-based emission standards on 
existing sources, standards which should be imposed 
incrementally rather than immediately. This approach will 
prevent imposing large costs on facilities, which could potentially 
be passed onto consumers in forms of higher prices for their 
goods.18 An incremental regime has the benefit of allowing 
sources to spread the costs of compliance over time but sacrifices 
the quick reduction in emissions that full compliance offers. 
While the question of approach is ultimately one for the 
legislature and should be answered based on the relative costs of 
compliance and burdens on industry associated with the different 
regimes, the assumption that old sources would be replaced by 
new sources has simply not proven true. Existing sources need to 
be regulated or the goals of the CAA will not be reached, at the 
expense of the public health and welfare. 
Existing source owners will resist legislation requiring old 
sources to be modified or replaced because this transition would 
be costly and may in some instances force plants to shut down. To 
counter and temper this resistance, the federal government needs 
to encourage investment in new plants by reducing the financial 
cost of compliance. Financial burden is the cause of the Old Plant 
Effect and will continue to be a sticking point for meaningful 
16. Id. at 1682
17. RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 429 (Robert C. Clark et al.
eds., 2nd ed. 2012) (“[T]he grandfathering of existing sources in the CAA has provided an 
incentive to continue running existing facilities in order to avoid triggering the expensive 
and time-consuming requirements for new and modified facilities.”).  
18. The Government Accountability Office found that imposing new regulations on
existing coal-fired power plants “would likely increase electricity prices in some 
regions.”  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO–12–635, EPA REGULATIONS AND 
ELECTRICITY: BETTER MONITORING BY AGENCIES COULD STRENGTHEN EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 
POTENTIAL CHALLENGES 38 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12–635.  
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reform.19 Therefore, reducing costs should be a major goal of 
remedial legislation. For instance, Congress could offer tax credits 
for investment in pollution control technology or subsidize this 
investment, which would be similar to current subsidies for 
“green” energy initiatives.20 Congress could also impose a tax on 
fuel sources that would be used to subsidize 
investment.21 Additionally, the federal government could offer 
low-interest loans to sources, which would allow them to finance 
pollution control technologies for years to come. Finally, the 
option to force sources into compliance exists through the broad 
powers of Congress. The viability of this option depends on the 
contemporary political winds and how important the CAA’s goals 
are to the legislature. In any event, achieving the goals of 
the CAA by regulating existing sources is imperative. The federal 
government needs to explore creative and cooperative policies to 
encourage transition to cleaner sources as soon as possible. 
19. Nash & Revesz, supra note 4, at 1711 (explaining that environmental compliance
costs influence source owners’ choices regarding existing and new sources). 
20. See, e.g., Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 48C (2006).
21. See, e.g., Mona Hymel, The United States’ Experience With Energy-Based Tax
Incentives: The Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, 38 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 43 (2006) (arguing, generally, that the United States has historically used the tax code 
to influence energy policy and choices).
